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This article attempts to analyze the theoretical 
overview of China, United States of America, and 
Southeast Asia countries strategic interest in South 
China Sea conflict. This study is carried by 
projecting their national interest in South China Sea 
and analyzed them theoretically by using Balance of 
Influence Theory and Hedging Strategy. The 
purpose of this study was to analyze the strategy of 
Southeast Asian countries and extra regional powers 
(China and US) used to keep each other 
constructively and cooperatively engaged in the 
region and to promote rule and norm-based 
arrangements and principles that help them to 
achieve their national interest and deny intramural 
hegemony in South China Sea. 
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Artikel ini berupaya untuk menganalisa tinjauan 
teoritis mengenai kepentingan strategis Cina, AS, 
dan negara-negara Asia Tenggara dalam konflik 
Laut Cina Selatan. Studi ini dilakukan dengan 
memproyeksikan kepentingan nasional negara-
negara tersebut di Laut Cina Selatan dan 
menganalisanya secara teoritis dengan 
menggunakan teori Balance of Influence Theory and 
Hedging Strategy. Tujuan dari studi ini untuk 
menganalisa strategi negara-negara Asia Tenggara 
dan negara ekstra regional (Cina dan AS) untuk 
saling menahan diri secara konstruktif dan terikat 
dalam kerja sama di kawasan dan mempromosikan 
aturan dan norma dalam perjanjian dan prinsip-
prinsip yang dapat membantu mereka meraih 
kepentingan nasional mereka dan mengabaikan 
hegemoni di Laut Cina Selatan. 
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Introduction  
South China Sea is a marine 
area which is in the Pacific Ocean area 
covering more than 200 small islands, 
rocks and reefs. Most are in the range 
of Paracel and Spratly islands that are 
often disputed and political tensions of 
a few countries in the vicinity. Based 
on the United Nations Convention on 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was 
adopted in 1982, every country has the 
right to enter the area up to 12 nautical 
miles as part  of  its sovereignty and  
for the 200 nautical miles Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ). 
Obscurity of regarding the 
rules of UNCLOS stoning area has no 
limits continent, often lead to 
unilateral claims over the South China 
Sea to carry out exploration and 
exploitation. The countries that are 
often involved dispute because this 
claim is Brunei, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and 
China (Roman, 2005). 
South China Sea is second in 
the world busiest lane and potentially 
large oil reserves in the amount of 17.7 
billion tons, more of Kuwait (13 
billion tons), which is the fourth 
country with the world's oil resources 
(Suharna, 2012).  
According to estimates of the 
US Geological Survey (USGS) 60% - 
70% of the hydrocarbons in the South 
China Sea is a natural gas (Nugraha, 
2011). It is estimated that the total 
amount of reserves and undiscovered 
resources are found in the basin off the 
coast of South China Sea is 28 billion 
barrels. Speculation Spratly Islands 
could be oil bearing province is 
because the region contains substantial 
oil resources. 
Most of hydrocarbon gas fields 
explored in the area around Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Vietnam. US Geological Survey 
shows that about 60 to 70 percent of 
hydrocarbon resources is the area of 
natural gas. Estimated natural gas 
reserves of the South China Sea is 2 
quadrillion cubic feet. Other reports 
China's estimated 193 billion barrels’ 
equivalent per day just to the Spratly 
Islands alone (US Department of 
Energy, 2013).  
These advantages make this 
region a potentially strategic stability 
in the Asia Pacific region. Besides, is 
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one of the world's major oil transport 
lane, ownership also creates an 
increase in its own bargaining position 
(The Military Balance, 2013). 
Balance of Influence 
Concept Balance of Influence 
is a form evolution of the concept 
Balance Power (Morgenthau, 1920) 
and Balance of threat (Walt, 1987). 
Universally ignore variable economic 
interdependence in the global system 
and focus only on the basis of  military 
power (Ross, 2006).  
Similarly, the concept balance 
of threat who tend to be 
confrontational balance with emerging 
threats. Both concepts are no 
alternatives to do the same work 
cooperatively with countries that are 
considered as a challenger or a threat.  
The more complex 
constellation of interests in the current 
global order, it takes concept with 
more cooperative in analyzing of 
behavior a country to achieve its 
interests. As foreign policy conducted 
by Mongolia in maintaining good 
relations between China and Russia, 
the balance of influence is done 
through involvement of the United 
States and other strategic partners 
(Reeves, 2012).  
Therefore, Evelyn Goh, 
provides a new alternative to analyze 
the behavior of these countries, which 
is none other than the concept balance 
of Influence realized through hedging 
strategies. 
Goh defines hedging as a 
package of strategies that aim to avoid 
(or planned as a coincidence) situation 
of anarchy where is a clash of interest 
and ideology between the hegemon 
and contender in the international 
order and the countries outside of the 
second category cannot decide to do 
alternative balance, bandwagoning or 
neutral. By contrast, countries outside 
these two categories choose to be in 
the middle of the cooperation is 
beneficial to both or avoid choosing is 
on one side (counterweight or 
hegemon). 
It's as confirmed Goh (2006) 
describes the hedging strategy as “a set 
of strategies aimed at avoiding (or 
planning for contingencies in) a 
situation in which states cannot decide 
upon straighter forward alternatives 
such as balancing, bandwagoning, or 
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neutrality. Instead they cultivate a 
middle position that forestalls or 
avoids having to choose one side (or 
one straightforward policy stance) at 
the obvious expense of another.” 
Hedging mutually intelligible 
in their respective states to maintain 
extensive economic relations, 
mutually benefit each other, 
addressing uncertainty and security 
concerns. Hedging also helps prevent 
geopolitical rivalry of being a self- 
fulfilling prophecy (Medeiros, 2006). 
The Medeiros (2006) describes the 
dimensions cooperative hedging 
strategy is becoming increasingly 
given   persistent   worries   about the 
huge bilateral trade deficit, China's 
unfair trade practices, the value of 
currency, espionage technology, and 
the scope of PLA modernization. 
The Southeast Asia region is 
categorized as a country and state 
hegemon lead-balancer with 
classifying China as a hegemon. 
Aggressiveness growth and expansion 
in the region to acquire economic and 
military modernization. In this case, 
the United States emerged as the lead 
balancer in order to counter China's 
growth and status quo in the region 
(Goh, 2005). 
The author uses hedging 
strategies to analyze the countries of 
Southeast Asia to respond to emerging 
countries hegemon and balancer. 
There are fears in a multipolar system 
instability by countries small and 
medium causes of competing interests 
between countries hegemon and 
balancer. Therefore, small countries in 
Southeast Asia using hedging strategy 
because it is not possible to use the 
strategy of balancing and 
bandwagoning purely with powerful 
countries (Goh, 2007). 
There are three forms of 
elements in the hedging strategy to be  
implemented in the region for small 
and medium countries: indirect 
balancing, complex engagement, and 
enmeshing a  number of regional 
powers (Goh, 2005).  
“Indirect balancing policies are 
designed to counter the target state‟s 
ability to constrain the subject state, 
either through non-specific deterrence 
or defense strengthening, or through 
building diplomatic, economic, and 
political relationships with third states 
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or organizations that can be converted 
into leverage against the target state 
when relations with it deteriorate” 
(Goh, 2006). Indirect balancing can be 
implemented by the countries of 
Southeast Asia with persuade the 
United States to participate as 
observers in the disputed South China 
Sea to counter the Chinese forces that 
involved in the security issues. 
Complex approach to 
engagement is a hegemon country 
(China). Through political, security, 
and strategies are expected to abide by 
the rules and norms (preventive 
diplomacy) prevailing in Southeast 
Asia. A policy of constructive 
engagement is understood as a hedge 
to reduce the aggressiveness of 
potential Chinese domination but still 
benefit the countries of Southeast Asia 
(Goh, 2005). 
Elements of the latter is 
enmeshing a few regional powers, 
where hedging as public policy will 
gather (enmeshing) great powers to 
establish a regional order stability. 
Southeast Asia hedging against things 
that are not desirable, such as: Chinese 
hegemony, the US withdrawal of the 
region and the instability of the order 
in the region. For the countries of 
Southeast Asia to collect as much as 
possible partners (South Korea, Japan, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
India) in the South China Sea dispute 
as an observer in the settlement. 
Research Method 
To explain how the projections 
of countries that have strategic 
importance to the problems of the 
south China sea, this study uses a 
qualitative method which is the 
exploration of information on the 
conflict south China sea which is 
reinforced by the study of related 
literature. 
Result and Discussion 
Strategic interests of China Sea 
dispute 
Since the first Chinese state 
was the most sensitive issue of 
sovereignty. Experience in foreign 
encroachment what makes this 
country are determined to maintain 
national unity and integrity. Therefore, 
Chinese leaders are determined to 
defend the territory against political 
sovereignty and the Tibet Xianjiang. 
China has established that the South 
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China Sea is a “core national interest” 
expressed by Dai Bingguo, Vice 
Foreign Minister of China in late July 
2009. 
The PRC‟s first core interest is 
maintaining its fundamental system 
and state security, second is state 
sovereignty and territorial security, 
and the third is the continued stable 
development of the economy and 
society...in specific terms, Tibet 
Xianjiang, Taiwan and South China 
Sea island as well (Sukasa, 2010). 
China showed the 
inconvenience that dispute resolution 
should be the parties concerned 
without outside intervention. In 
addition, China needs to be a powerful 
naval fleet and strategic bases is an 
essential precondition. China's 
assertiveness in defending its claim to 
the South China Sea region associated 
with the desire to gain status as a 
maritime power that reliable. 
US interested in security at 
South China Sea as a commercial 
traffic lane, as defined by Hillary 
Clinton: “The United States, like every 
nation, has a national interest in 
freedom of navigation, open access to 
Asia‟s maritime commons and respect 
for international law in the South Cina 
Sea”(Sukasa, 2010). 
As one of the six lanes, 
alternative route in the eastern US 
Persian Gulf. South China Sea to be 
part of global defense system because 
it is a cruise line for US fleets in 
implementing its strategic interests. 
The end of the Cold War, at a certain 
extent has brought changes in US 
foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The 
US Navy has closed bases in Subic 
Bay and Clark air base caused   by 
several factors, among others, failure 
to achieve agreement on the lease 
between the two countries. The closure 
of military bases in the Philippines 
showed that the physical presence of 
the US in Southeast Asia has been 
reduced. 
Implementation the Balance of 
Influence (Hedging Strategy) 
A survey says that the strategic 
environment and defense relations in 
Asia might have got an important shift 
in the geopolitical dynamics of Asia 
(Goh, 2008). The shift is influenced by 
the rise of China in the Asia Pacific 
region, both in the scope of economic 
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and military.  
China showed a more flexible 
stance on strategic change in the Asia 
Pacific region, especially in Southeast 
Asia. China became active in the 
development of security regionalism. 
This attitude makes China more 
accepted in the region and has a 
stronger position in competition the 
other powers in the region. 
Therefore, the best way for the 
United States and other countries in 
the Asia Pacific region    is    
developing    multilateral approaches 
to prevent the dominance of China in 
the region. It is implemented at 
internal consolidation to strengthen its 
position in new developments in 
Southeast Asia and East Asia 
(Prasetyono, 2008). 
First performed in hedging 
strategies the countries of Southeast 
Asia are indirect balancing (soft 
balancing), which each involve other 
major powers (between the United 
States and China) by way of 
persuasion to act as a counterweight  in 
the balance of power in the area so it 
does not appear the state hegemon 
absolute , Southeast Asian countries  
in fact did hedging strategy in the ARF 
(ASEAN Regional Forum) to avoid 
the three threats that exist in the region 
of Southeast Asia: Chinese hegemony 
or domination; withdrawal of 
cooperation the United States and 
regional order is unstable. 
ARF is an official 
intergovernmental dialogue forum 
with the main goal to build mutual 
trust between member states 
(Confidence    Building    Measure/ 
CBM), preventive diplomacy, and the 
conflict resolution. The discussion 
covered by ARF very broad, is not 
limited to security issues in Southeast 
Asia but also in Asia Pacific.  
ARF is not a forum to solve 
regional security issues in the Asia 
Pacific region, but rather a forum for 
dialogue to discuss and reconcile the 
different points of view, to build a 
sense of mutual trust and shared 
interests on regional security issues in 
the Asia Pacific region, regarding the 
settlement of disputes South China Sea 
(Andrea, 1996).  
In the forum of ARF, the 
countries of Southeast Asia could 
restrict the activity of the forces 
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outside the region and take collective 
action to prevent the domination of 
power in Southeast Asia. Such actions 
can be said with a hedging strategy 
realized by enmeshing. 
ASEAN countries' efforts in 
maintaining the US military existence 
in the region is needed to balance the 
aggressiveness of China. In the 
implementation, Malaysia and 
Singapore continue to conduct 
military exercises with the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand 
in cooperation Five Power Defense 
Arrangements (FPDA).  
Likewise, Thailand continues 
to hold annual military exercises with 
the United States, known as the 
“Cobra Gold.” Since 1995, the US 
navy has participated in a series of 
annual bilateral cooperation exercises 
in Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and the 
Philippines in the Cooperation Afloat 
Readiness and Training (CARAT) 
(Collins, 2003). 
Similarly, the state lead- 
balancer (United States) and of the 
hegemon (China), they do a hedging 
strategy to counter the strength of each 
other. The US presence in the ARF are 
very intense because of the strategic 
interests of the military and its 
economy in the Asia Pacific region 
and Southeast Asia.  At the ARF 
meeting  to-18 in 2011 in Bali, US 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said 
that the United States is a party 
interested in the sea South China Sea, 
a route that transports nearly half of 
global trade and is vital for transport 
military United States (Bower and 
Santoso, 2013).  
The arrival of President Barack 
Obama on the 18th ARF in Bali also 
proved that the US will not allow 
China to stand alone in a dominant 
position in Asia, especially in 
overlapping claims in the South China 
Sea. In the ARF, China implemented 
many policies that invites sympathy 
from the countries of Southeast Asia.  
To comply with one of the 
principles of transparency in military 
ARF (Confidence building measure/ 
CBM) in dialogue forum 3rd in 1996 
in Jakarta, China began to publish a 
White Paper on defense in 1998. The 
white paper contains a full report on 
the assessment of China to the global 
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security situation, the doctrines of 
defense, national defense policy, 
defense spending, modernization and 
deployment       of       armed     force, 
development measures in the military 
and so on.  
Until now, the latest Defense 
White Paper was released in March 
2011 (ASEAN Regional Forum Series 
Document, 2013). This was done to 
build confidence among ARF 
members against China for the sake of 
eliminating image aggressiveness and 
sensitivity of China. China thus avoid 
the situation of security dilemma that 
occurs when developing its military 
forces, especially in the policy of the 
Blue Water Navy. Thus, it can be said 
that China undertake complex hedging 
strategies in the form of engagement 
with the countries of Southeast Asia. 
In the fifth ARF Inter Sessional 
Support Group (ISG) stated that the 
ARF opens great possibilities to 
dialogue and informal bilateral 
workshop (ASEAN Regional Forum 
Series Document, 1997). This 
facilitates China because the 
mechanism of settlement bilaterally 
with countries facing other claimants 
individually, the possibility of China 
to win the greater. This is reflected in 
the Chinese rage when US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton declared that 
“freedom of navigation in the South 
China Sea” in the interests of the 
United States (Clinton, 2011). 
Conclusions  
In the disputed South China 
Sea, hedging strategies used by the 
countries in the region as a way to 
unify (engaging) China and  the United 
States in order to create a  good 
relationship between them so that the 
regional countries can avoid a 
situation of anarchy that usually 
occurs between countries  balancer 
and hegemon. State balancer (United 
States) and hegemon (China) also 
undertake hedging strategies to 
cooperatively engage one another so 
that they are still in a global order of 
peace, because it is not possible to do 
the balance of power in the extreme in 
this region. 
Hedging strategies realized 
with the involvement of the countries 
that the dispute in the South China Sea 
to the ARF (ASEAN Regional 
Forum), a forum is a point convenient 
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for   the checkered diplomatic major 
countries in the Asia Pacific region 
with a record of regional power in the 
ARF can maintain the balance are 
stable (stable balance) between the 
great powers in it.  
Based on the results of these 
discussions, the authors concluded that 
the hedging strategy taken by the 
United States, China, and countries in 
Southeast Asia is a rational strategy to 
be implemented due to the intensity of 
the tensions in the South China Sea 
region.  
Recommendation 
Although the author has 
reviewed the literature in projecting 
the conflict settlement in southern 
China Sea involving several countries 
like USA, China and ASEAN, the 
author realized that the only 
diplomacy and hedging strategies to 
solve the problem. In accordance with 
the level of conflict then there will be 
another suitable shape, such as 
disclosure of stimulus response theory, 
combined with the application of 
international law. Likewise, the 
research methods used in future 
studies will more accurately with 
quantitative methods so that the results 
can support exploratory International 
policy. 
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